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What is the purpose of the ASEAN free trade area - JC History Tuition - ASEAN Notes

What is the purpose of the ASEAN Free Trade Area?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN Growth and Development of ASEAN: Promoting regional economic cooperation

Learn more about the ASEAN Free Trade Area that was established in 1992 [Video by NLB Singapore].

Renewed vigour: The origins of the AFTA
The end of the Cold War marked a turning point for ASEAN. With the re-integration of Europe and the formation of the European Union (EU), coupled with the formalisation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), ASEAN-6 saw a pressing need to step up its efforts to compete with these regional trading blocs.

The recent initial agreement to create a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has been a cause of concern in ASEAN. The possibility of trade diversion resulting from closure of the North American market has made ASEAN more cognizant of the need for a ballast to overcome the loss of some of the trade with North America. Similarly, growing fears about the creation of a European Economic Area (EEA) have been voiced within ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “AFTA: The Way Ahead” by Seiji F Naya and Pearl Imada Iboshi.

During the Fourth ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 27-29 January 1992, the six ASEAN member states signed the Singapore Declaration, which outlined the unified aim of establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

Functions of the AFTA & ASEAN Enlargement
The creation of the AFTA was achieved through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, in which tariff rates for manufactured and processed agricultural products had to be reduced to 0-5 percent within a fifteen-year time-frame. In particular, the Declaration identified fifteen groups of products to be subjected to the CEPT Scheme, such as cement, fertiliser, electronics and textiles.

For the newer members (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, or CMLV), they were given a longer timeframe to implement tariff reductions.

During the 26th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting on 22-23 September 1994, the timeframe was reduced from fifteen years to ten years, so as to realise the AFTA goals by 2003. In addition, the CEPT scheme was to be applied to all unprocessed agricultural products.

As a result, the value of intra-ASEAN trade rose from less than US$44 billion in 1993 to more than US$85 billion in 1997, suggesting the significant contributions of the AFTA.

Trend of ASEAN Total Trade and Intra-ASEAN Trade (ASEAN Trade Statistics Database)
Source: Thomson Reuters

Building a resilient regional market: The post-Asian Financial Crisis phase
In spite of the disastrous Asian Financial Crisis (July 1997), the regional association remained undeterred by the economic shocks. During the 6th ASEAN Summit on 15-16 December 1998, the ASEAN-6 members agreed to bring forward the deadline of the AFTA implementation from 2003 to 2002 for items in the Inclusion List. This was known as the Hanoi Declaration.

In 1997, the international financial crisis struck Southeast Asia hard. Immediately, the usual instant commentaries predicted that, as a result of the crisis, ASEAN countries would retreat into isolation, that ASEAN would fall into disarray, that AFTA was dead. Such speculations, some of it evidently arising from herd instinct, were made in defiance of logic and without waiting for the facts to unfold.

[…] The fact was that, in 1998, at their summit in Ha Noi, the ASEAN leaders again advanced the completion date of AFTA, this time by one year, to the beginning of 2002 for the six original signatories to the AFTA Agreement, with the later signatories given a few more years to adjust to regional free trade.

An excerpt taken from a statement by Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN, at the workshop on ‘Beyond AFTA: Facing the Challenge of Closer Economic Integration‘, 2 October 2000.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Singapore - What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries

What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: Growth and Development of ASEAN: Intra-ASEAN Relations; relations between ASEAN and external powers

The Cold War lens: Consequences of the Second Indochina War
During the Vietnam War, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973, which provided an official basis for the full withdrawal of the American troops from South Vietnam. As part of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, the reduced commitment of the USA in the Asia-Pacific meant that there was a corresponding decline in its military presence in Thailand and the Philippines.

However, Hanoi held deep suspicions of the US motives of manipulating ASEAN as a Cold War instrument in the region, which conflicted with ASEAN’s neutral position as declared under its 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Even after the Paris Agreement, some ASEAN member nations maintained relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), which Hanoi interpreted as a confirmation of its suspicions.

Besides, tensions were high as Thailand turned to China for help with its looming border security threat. In February 1979, Vietnam and China clashed in a short military confrontation, which could be seen as an extension of the Sino-Soviet split.

In Hanoi’s view, ASEAN is both an offshoot and a disguise of the US-led SEATO that serve the US interests and this explained the “insincerity of ASEAN proposal of neutrality”. Thus, in Hanoi’s future relations with ASEAN the opposition aspect would be greater than the cooperation aspect. Moreover, cooperation should serve to drive a wedge among ASEAN member states, that is “to exploit contradictions among those in the opposite side”, which had become one of the guiding principles of the Vietnamese foreign policy with respect to ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Flying Blind: Vietnam’s Decision to Join ASEAN” by Nguyen Vu Tung.

After the fall of Saigon, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien raised a ‘four-point position’ in July 1976, which antagonised ASEAN nations. For instance, one of the four points stated “Regional states should develop cooperation among themselves in accordance with the specific conditions of each state and in the interest of genuine independence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thus contributing to the cause of world peace.”

At this stage, Vietnam refused to recognise ZOPFAN and join ASEAN.

Mounting Tensions: The Third Indochina War
In December 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea, causing the outbreak of the Third Indochina War that alarmed ASEAN. On 7 January 1979, a pro-Vietnamese government known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was formed. As a result, ASEAN-Vietnam relations soured.

In response to this gross violation of national sovereignty, ASEAN made repeated joint statements to call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the recognition of self-determination. In particular, ASEAN took the lead in calling for the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) that comprised of three anti-Phnom Penh factions in June 1982.

The Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) retaliated by declaring ASEAN countries as “hostile to Vietnam” from 1979 onwards.

As far as ASEAN is concerned, Vietnam is pursuing tactics that deliberately evade and obscure the central fact of the issue: Vietnamese armed occupation of Kampuchea. ASEAN rejects that implicit bilateralization of the problem in Vietnam’s effort to define it as a Thai-Kampuchean border dispute. Moreover, ASEAN has been unwilling to see the Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea be submerged in a diffuse general agenda on problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia that might include such topics as US basis in the Philippines. […] Furthermore, Vietnamese initiated bilateral official contacts with ASEAN states appear to be manipulated in a manner calculated to crack ASEAN’s external solidarity by driving a political wedge between the members.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia Divided: The Asean-Indochina Crisis” by Donald E. Weatherbee.

A new age: Post-Cold War transition
On 23 October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, marking an official end of the Third Indochina War. The late 1980s marked a turning point for ASEAN-Vietnam relations. Vietnam launched its Doi Moi reform policy to undergo political and economic transformation in both domestic and international fronts. In terms of foreign policy, Vietnam sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with ASEAN member nations in spite of its past transgressions.

The period 1992-1995, spanning an interview from the collapse of the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with China through full membership in ASEAN and diplomatic recognition by the United States, was also a time of significant change in elite views of the nature of the international system, and its implications for Vietnam.

[…] The abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of Vietnam’s main supporter certainly qualifies as a major “external shock”, and it had been preceded by the economic shock of the 1980s which, by undermining the old ways of conceiving socialism, had cleared the way for new thinking in the external sphere.

An excerpt taken from “Changing Worlds: Vietnam’s Transition from Cold War to Globalization” by David W. P. Elliott.

In 1992, Vietnam joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). On 28 July 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN as a full member. Subsequently, Vietnam participated in the ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA), facilitating regional economic integration that made ASEAN flourish economically.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did ASEAN promote economic growth in the 1970s 3

How did ASEAN promote economic growth in the 1970s?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN Growth and Development of ASEAN: Promoting regional economic cooperation

How it all began: ASEAN Declaration
On 8 August 1967, five Southeast Asian nations signed the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok to officiate the creation of a regional association. Within the Declaration, three out of seven objectives related to economic development.

For instance, the fifth objective states that member nations were to “collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade”.

In the late 1960s, most member states of ASEAN were largely reliant on primary products. Malaysia was a key exporter of tin, natural rubber and palm oil. Thailand specialised in the production of tapioca and rice. Yet, regional economic cooperation was not at the top of the priority list, since the main export markets for the above products were outside ASEAN. This could be the result of differing stages of economic development among the ASEAN-5.

The ASEAN economies exhibit a mixture of the characteristics of the economies of the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. There is, on the one hand, the highly industrialised, affluent and small economy of Singapore, while on the other large, less affluent and rather dualistic economies of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. Then there is Malaysia which is medium-size, natural resource rich and relatively affluent; […]

Singapore, with its policy of virtually free trade, is already well-integrated with the rest of the world, while Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand – all seeking to industrialise themselves – have high tariff and other trade barriers. Malaysia’s industrialisation strategy is also based on restricted trade, but the degree of such restrictions is lower. Given this mixture of structural characteristics, policies of trade liberalisation cannot be successful without greater co-ordination of industrial strategies of the member countries.

An excerpt taken from “ASEAN Into the 1990s” by Alison Broinowski.

Oil Shocks and The Bali Summit
The first oil crisis of 1973 had adversely affected oil-importing nations, such as Thailand and the Philippines. In addition, price fluctuations in the world markets made the attainment of economic growth unsustainable. ASEAN members began to contemplate on the need for a regional market to sustain industrialisation.

As such, Indonesian ministers (such as Widjojo Nitisastro) under Suharto’s leadership invited ASEAN leaders to attend a gathering in Jakarta in November 1975. This ‘Meeting of ASEAN Economic and Planning Ministers’ set the stage for the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 1976.

From the economic standpoint, the Bali Summit concluded with the signing of the ASEAN Concord. In consideration of the challenges posed by external shocks, the Concord sought to address the risk of supply shortages for food and energy.

One key initiative was the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) that required each member state to lead a joint venture with other members. The AIPs sought to address the lack of complementariness between ASEAN economies, thus facilitating economic integration. It was estimated that each project required an investment of up to US$300 million.

However, not all member states expressed enthusiasm towards the projects.

According to Widjojo Nitisastro, Indonesia had resisted all notions of trade liberalization and regional economic integration. Indonesia, he said, was more concerned with food, as well as energy, security and with the establishment of large-scale industrial projects. Widjojo believed that, if a country felt that trade liberalization was good for it, it would open up trade unilaterally anyway.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-general” by Rodolfo Severino.

Musings of an ASEAN Free Trade Area
Yet, the attempts to promote regional economic cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s were arguably disappointing, given that intra-ASEAN trade levels remained low. In the case of the AIPs, only two out of five projects were implemented, namely the urea projects under Malaysia and Indonesia. The rest were eventually withdrawn.

During the 13th ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting in May 1982, the Philippine President Marcos raised the notion of a free trade regime involving ASEAN members, which was later established a decade later.

Six years have now passed since we inaugurated in Bali, Indonesia a broad and ambitious program for regional cooperation in our part of Asia, which dramatically transformed the character of our association of Southeast Asian nations and has since riveted the attention of our peoples and governments on the tasks of making regional community possible and real in our part of the world.

[…] If free trade is a goal which commends itself to the other ASEAN member-governments, then we should lose no time in so resolving that it is. Establishing a free trade regime is an enormous undertaking, requiring a great deal of preparation and lead time. If we resolve today to establish it, perhaps we should need all of the next ten years to stage it.

An excerpt taken from the “Address of President Marcos at the 13th Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers“, 20 May 1982.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that ASEAN was effective in promoting regional economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When did Myanmar join ASEAN

When did Myanmar join ASEAN?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Historical context
During the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1996, Myanmar was granted an observer status. In August 1996, Myanmar applied for full membership. On 23 July 1997, Myanmar was formally accepted as a member of the ASEAN regional organisation.

ASEAN being put to the test: Western objections
However, the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN was not welcomed by some external powers, especially those in the western parts of the world, such as the European Union (EU) members and the United States.

In preparatory negotiations for the annual ASEAN-EU Joint Co-operation Council meeting in Bangkok, scheduled for November 1997, the EU insisted that Myanmar’s attendance be downgraded to “passive presence”, a condition that was unacceptable to ASEAN. The impasse led to the postponement of the meeting and a chilling relationship between the two groupings. Throughout 1998 and 1999, Europe maintained such policies towards Myanmar because of a “lack of progress to break the [domestic] political stalemate, the harassment of pro-democracy activists and the poor human rights record in Myanmar”.

An excerpt taken from “ASEAN Enlargement Impacts and Implications” by Carolyn L. Gates and Mya Than.

As a result of Myanmar’s domestic crisis, Myanmar was prohibited from attending an ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers Meeting (AEMM) in Berlin on 30 March 1999. Myanmar’s non-attendance resulted in the cancellation of the AEMM, reflecting a strain in EU-ASEAN relations in the late 1990s.

The genesis of Myanmar’s entry to ASEAN
When the regional association was established in August 1967, Myanmar did not identify itself with ASEAN, given its political stance as one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

There are two key factors that could possibly explain Myanmar’s interest to join the association in the post-Cold War era: Its reversal of an isolationist policy and interest in regional economic cooperation.

From the domestic standpoint, the military government had been pre-occupied with ethnic insurgencies for decades, expending substantial resources to contain unrest. By the 1990s, the government managed to sign peace treaties to (temporarily) cease intra-state violence. Hence, it could now turn its attention to regional developments, including engagement with ASEAN.

As for the international dimension, the government was cognisant of the Western criticisms towards its domestic controversies, such as the use of force against activists and opposition groups. International isolationism was akin to a tightening noose around its neck. As such, the government desired cooperation with ASEAN to end this political ostracism.

Myanmar’s critics have argued that the reasons behind Myanmar’s decision were both political and economic. Politically, it was boycotted by the Western bloc led by the United States and the EU, the country needed international recognition and this led to the decision to join ASEAN. The economic reason was that the country needed development assistance and economic cooperation with groups of countries which were sympathetic to Myanmar and ASEAN was ready to accept it as a member, since the country was facing economic sanctions imposed by the West.

An excerpt taken from “Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Co-operation Experience“. by Mya Than.

A family united?
Although there were reservations expressed by Thailand and the Philippines over Myanmar’s poor human rights record, Malaysia rallied behind Myanmar.

During a keynote address by then-Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, on 24 July 1997, he asserted that the inclusion of both Myanmar and Laos should be hailed as a great achievement in bringing the association closer to the goal of realising the ‘ASEAN-10’ vision.

ASEAN’s accomplishments are even more remarkable considering that not so long ago there were wars and conflicts in the region and within many of the ASEAN countries. It was predicted that if North Vietnam achieved victory, then, like dominoes one by one the other countries in the region would fall to Communism and chaos. We were told then, as we are told now, that we needed foreign protection against predatory neighbours such as a victorious Vietnam and the other powerful Eastern countries.

An excerpt taken from “Keynote Address By The Honourable Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed The Prime Minister of Malaysia“, 24 July 1997.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ASEAN’s membership expansion in the 1990s has strengthened the organisation?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What changes did Poland go through in 1989

What changes did Poland go through in 1989?

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Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 3: End of Bipolarity [Popular movements in the West and the Eastern bloc to end the Cold War]

Historical context
In response to worsening economic problems in the late 1980s, the Polish people participated in strikes. In September 1988, Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak (the right-hand man of General Jaruzelski) held a secret meeting to discuss the political situation of Poland. This was a stark contrast to the Polish government’s response to the strikes in 1980-1981, in which martial law was declared.

By the end of the meeting, both parties agreed to hold talks (known as the ‘Round Table’), which began on 6 February 1989. Two months later, the ‘Round Table Agreement’ was signed, reflecting successful efforts for political reforms in a Communist-controlled Poland.

By February 1989, President Wojciech Jaruzelski agreed to open ’round-table negotiations’ with Solidarity in an attempt to introduce democratic elements into Polish politics. An agreement signed in April 1989 legalized Solidarity and stipulated new election rules. Non-communist parties were now allowed to compete for 35 per cent of the seats in the Polish Diet, yet the formula ensured that Jaruzelski would retain the power of decision.

An excerpt taken from “Transatlantic Relations Since 1945: An Introduction” by Jussi Hanhimaki, Barbara Zanchetta and Benedikt Schoenborn.

The Round Table Agreement and its consequences on the Cold War
In the Agreement, there were several noteworthy points, such as the legalisation of independent trade unions (which included the popular Solidarity) and the creation of Senate. More importantly, an election was to be held on 4 June 1989.

Of course, the Polish Round Table talks set into motion the chain of extraordinary events of 1989 in Europe. As a result of the talks the first completely free election in one house, the Senate, occurred in Eastern Europe in forty years. Because of the unexpectedly overwhelming triumph of Solidarity in the elections in June 1989, in August the first non-Communist prime minister in Eastern Europe in forty years came to office after the Communists were unable to form a government when some of their former satellite Peasant Party allies defected. […]

A Soviet intervention in Poland would have meant the death of Gorbachev’s détente with the West, with deleterious consequences for his perestroika project. Gorbachev thus faced a stark choice he had not expected or desired: intervene in Poland or let a non-Communist government come to power.

An excerpt taken from “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe” by Juan J. J. Linz.

By the end of the first free parliamentary election in Poland since 1928, the Solidarity emerged victorious. On 24 August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the first non-Communist prime minister in the Eastern Bloc. Thus began the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that the fall of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe was mainly the result of popular movements in 1989?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the End of the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did ASEAN respond to the South China Sea dispute - ASEAN Notes

How did ASEAN respond to the South China Sea dispute?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Historical context
In the 1990s, ASEAN faced a new challenge, particularly the need to maintain amicable relations with a rising Great Power in a multipolar world. While China stood on the same side as ASEAN in response to the Third Indochina War in the 1980s, the latter was once again put to the test. This time, the contention lies with the strategic body of water, known as the South China Sea.

By some estimates, the South China Sea is one of the most valuable strategic locations on the planet. It has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, and is traversed by half the world’s merchant fleet tonnage and a third of all maritime traffic. The value of trade passing through it annually is estimated at over US$3 trillion. This provides a lucrative incentive to littoral states to assert even tenuous claims, and unsurprisingly, there is fierce competition among them to carve out a piece of this prized marine real estate.

An excerpt taken from “The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Asia and the Pacific” by Simon Chesterman Hisashi Owada and Ben Saul.

Tensions on the rise: ASEAN’s diplomacy
Although member states like the Philippines had competing claims as well, China agreed to participate in meetings with ASEAN, as seen by its involvement in the China-ASEAN Senior Official Meeting (SOC) in April 1995. Notably, the meeting was held in Hangzhou after the ‘Mischief Reef’ incident two months earlier.

On 8 February 1995, the Philippines identified eight Chinese ships in vicinity of the Mischief Reef, which was about 200 kilometres from the Philippine island of Palawan. In response, the Philippine President Fidel Ramos cricitised China’s action. The dispute escalated tensions as Chinese territorial markers were destroyed and Chinese fishermen were arrested in March.

The de-escalation of the dispute started in the mid-1990s and was illustrated by a process of multilateral dialogue that began shortly after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident. […] Though China was not mentioned, the ASEAN foreign ministers expressed “their serious concern over recent developments which affect peace and stability in the South China Sea.” They also called “for the early resolution of the problems caused by the recent developments in Mischief Reef.” The statement was supported by Vietnam. On the eve of the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Hangzhou in April 1995, Chinese and ASEAN officials met for an informal meeting during which the latter expressed their concern about China’s aggressive action.

An excerpt taken from “Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a co-operative management regime” by Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers.

As a result of ASEAN’s call for a peaceful response to the dispute, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (钱其琛) declared prior to the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in August 1995 that China was ready to hold multilateral talks. In addition, China would accept the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 as a “basis for negotiation”.

After the ARF, ASEAN openly called on all parties to adhere to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. Additionally, the regional organisation pushed for a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”, which China agreed to sign in 2002. In essence, the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea‘ (DOC in short) ensured that China accepted a multilateral solution to the territorial dispute.

ASEAN and the PCA: A divided response?
Yet, the DOC did not mean much in the later stages. The Code was often flouted by claimants that included some ASEAN member states as well as China. In 2013, the Philippines lodged a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), signifying the first ever legal challenge to the territorial dispute.

On 12 July 2016, the PCA announced that its decision was in favour of the Philippines. The Tribunal objected to China’s claim based on the ‘Nine-Dash Line‘, asserting that there was “no legal basis” to claim “historic rights to resources”. More importantly, the Mischief Reef formed part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of the Philippines. As such, China had violated the Philippines’ sovereignty when it developed an artificial island on Mischief Reef.

Map depicting China’s “Nine-Dash Line” claim that the PCA rejected after its decision was made on Philippine’s challenge to the South China Sea dispute [Source: The Guardian].

As expected, China rejected the Tribunals’ findings. At the same time, China backed the position of Laos and Cambodia on this matter. A key point to note is that the Cambodian government announced that it would not support the Tribunal’s verdict, even before the PCA made its decision public. The Cambodian leader Hun Sen repeatedly stressed that the South China Sea dispute was not an issue between ASEAN and China.

Cambodia’s official statement very clearly reflected the preferences of the Chinese: “Cambodia views that this arbitration case is to settle the dispute brought by the Philippines against China, and this proceeding is not related with all of the ASEAN Member States … Therefore, Cambodia will not join in expressing any common position on the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that will render its decision on the dispute between the Philippines and China.” With that, China successfully divided ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection” by Daniel C. O’ Neill.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that Great Power politics were the key obstacle to ASEAN’s role in managing the South China Sea dispute.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When did Poland declare martial law - End of the Cold War Notes

When did Poland declare martial law?

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Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 3: End of Bipolarity [Popular movements in the West and the Eastern bloc to end the Cold War]

Historical context: Rise of Solidarity
The trade union Solidarność (Solidarity) was formed on 30 August 1980 following a strike action (also known as ‘Lenin Shipyard strike’) led by a factory electrician Lech Walesa at the Gdańsk Shipyard. The strike was a response to the Polish government’s price hike for food in 1980.

At that time, the government gave in to the demands of the strikers, leading to the Gdańsk Agreement being signed. This Agreement allowed worker representation through the Solidarity.

The most important stipulation of the [Gdańsk Agreement] was that it recognised the workers’ right to set up a free trade union, independent from the state and the governing communist party. This stipulation gave ground for the future registration of the “Solidarność” trade union, which later played a historic role in the peaceful overthrow of communism in Poland and directly entailed its fall in other European countries.

An excerpt taken from “Changing Industrial Relations and Modernisation of Labour Law” by Dr. Roger Blanpain and Manfred Weiss.

The martial law
This first legal free trade union formed in the communist Central and Eastern Europe soon gained widespread following. Within two weeks, the Solidarity’s membership size ballooned to nearly 10 million. Members included state employees.

The Solidarity became a non-violent social movement, engaging in civil resistance to protect the rights of workers. In September 1981,Walesa was elected President of the Solidarity.

In view of the growing popular opposition in Poland, the Polish Prime Minister General Jaruzelski declared martial law on 13 December 1981. Many Solidarity leaders were arrested and the political groups were forced to close down.

Our country is on the verge of an abyss. The achievements of many generations raised from the ashes is collapsing into ruin. The state structures no longer function.

Our extinguished economy is given more shocks every day … The atmosphere of never ending conflicts, misunderstanding, hatred, sows mental devastation, hurts tradition of tolerance. Strikes, strike alerts and protest actions have become standard.

[…] We cannot let these demonstrations be the spark causing a fire in the country.

The self-preservation instinct of the nation must be taken into account. We must bind the hands of adventurers before they push the country into civil war.

An excerpt taken from the Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski‘s speech on the day martial law was declared, 13 December 1981.

As a result of the martial law, the Solidarity union was now made illegal. The Polish streets were filled with armed soldiers and tanks. While the Soviet news publications justified the necessity of martial law in Poland, the Western reception was contrastingly negative.

In particular, US President Ronald Reagan addressed the Americans with great concern on the Polish situation. In his speech, he condemned the oppressive responses on the Polish people and vowed to impose economic sanctions on the government.

On 22 July 1983, martial law in Poland was officially suspended. However, the Solidarity movement reorganised itself underground.

The Polish Government has trampled underfoot solemn commitments to the UN Charter and the Helsinki accords. It has even broken the Gdansk agreement of August 1980, by which the Polish Government recognized the basic right of its people to form free trade unions and to strike.

[…] The United States is taking immediate action to suspend major elements of our economic relationships with the Polish Government. […] These actions are not directed against the Polish people. They are a warning to the Government of Poland that free men cannot and will not stand idly by in the face of brutal repression.

An excerpt taken from the US President’s “Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland“, 23 December 1981.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the fear of ideological expansion was the key reason for the declaration of martial law in Poland?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about End of the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - What is the Mischief Reef incident - South China Sea Dispute

What is the Mischief Reef incident?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

What is the ‘Mischief Reef’?
The Mischief Reef has many names: The Philippines calls it the Panganiban Reef, whereas China describes it as 美濟礁 (Meiji Reef) and the Vietnamese labels it as Đá Vành Khăn. It is a low-tide elevation located in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Although the Mischief Reef is within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which was established as within 200 nautical miles from the country as stated by 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), China has made claims to this disputed territory.

The Mischief Reef is located within the Spratly Islands, in which China was known to have built military installations in 1994 and 1995. [Map extracted from Forbes]

The dispute
On 8 February 1995, the Philippine authorities identified eight Chinese ships in the vicinity of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. In April 1995, these authorities publicised the arrest of 62 Chinese fishermen in the hotly-contested area, charging them with the violation of international law. The situation deteriorated when the Philippines identified Chinese markers on the Mischief Reef and other islands.

In response, the Philippines declared its intention to built 7 lighthouses to assert Filipino claims and support international navigation. Additionally, the government internationalised the matter, hoping to garner support from its long-term ally, the USA, which was bounded by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

The 1995 China/Philippines incident involving Mischief Reef (Meijijiao/Panganiban) may have had its origins in September 1994, when the Philippine armed forces detained some 55 fishers from the People’s Republic of China who tried to set up homes on one of the islands claimed by the Philippines. They were charged with illegal entry and illegal possession of explosives. In what may have been a tit-for-tat, China detained 35 Filipino fishers for a week in late January 1995 in the area of the Spratlys which the Philippines claimed and calls Kalayaan. Then on February 8, 1995, the Philippines accused China of breaking international law by stationing armed vessels at, and building structures on, the feature it calls Panganiban (Mischief Reef).

An excerpt taken from “Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea” by Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig.

Although China ratified the UNCLOS III in 1996, she provoked the Philippines and Vietnam by using a method of measurement to calculate her territorial waters. This method was applicable only to countries that are archipelagic, yet China was not classified as such.

ASEAN Response
On 18 March 1995, ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement in view of the Mischief Reef incident, expressing concern over the regional stability in the South China Sea. Although the statement intentionally omitted any mention of China, it was clearly directed at this active claimant. As described by the former Thai diplomat Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ASEAN member nations raised the matter on the South China Sea dispute, hoping to engage China amicably.

At the first meeting of the ASEAN and Chinese senior Foreign Ministry officials, in April 1995 in Hangzhou, a forum that I had proposed the year before, the ASEAN delegations raised pointed questions about the Chinese position on the South China Sea and particularly about the developments on Mischief Reef.

[…] Nevertheless, the discussions were significant, being the first time that China dealt with the South China Sea question in a multilateral setting, as opposed to its preference for discussing it only bilaterally.

An excerpt taken from “Entering Uncharted Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea” by Pavin Chachavalpongpun.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the South China Sea dispute was effectively managed by ASEAN?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN and the South China Sea dispute. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When did Indonesia get West Papua - Interstate Tensions Notes

When did Indonesia get West Papua?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 1: Inter-state tensions and co-operation: Causes of inter-state tensions

Historical background: The West New Guinea dispute
After the Netherlands ceded sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949, the Dutch retained control over the Western part of New Guinea (also known as ‘West Irian’). Its native inhabitants, the Papuans, have occupied the land for over 40,000 years.

More importantly, the Dutch continued to occupy West New Guinea for strategic reasons. The Netherlands can not only capitalise on the resource-rich territory, but also maintain its regional presence in Southeast Asia. In contrast, Sukarno believed that Indonesia should take control of West New Guinea to complete the decolonisation process.

According to the Netherlands, the 700,000 inhabitants of West Irian were racially and culturally unrelated to the Indonesians. Indonesia’s position was that its nationalist project had a territorial, rather than a racial, basis and was rooted in common suffering endured during the Dutch colonial occupation.

An excerpt taken from “Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories” by Jamie Trinidad.
JC History Tuition Online - West New Guinea Map - Interstate Tensions Notes
Map of the West Papua under the Dutch role before 1962 [Extracted from CQ Press]

International responses
In 1954, Indonesia raised its concerns of West New Guinea in the 9th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Then, Sukarno garnered support from the Afro-Asian nations during the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

International opinion on the matter was divided. While Indonesia had the backing of the Afro-Asian nations, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, the Netherlands was supported by Latin American nations and other key Western powers like the USA and the UK. Notably, Australia opposed Indonesia’s claim of West New Guinea, citing security concerns as the former administered the eastern part of the disputed territory.

There were, of course, no immediate direct results to be anticipated from this but it served notice on the world that the Indonesian struggle for West Irian now officially had behind it the support of virtually all the independent and semi-independent nations of Asia – including Communist China – and Africa, the populations of which comprised the vast majority of mankind.

An excerpt taken from “The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea Problem” by Robert C. Bone.

By 1960, more nations supported the aim to put an end to the West New Guinea dispute. On 27 November 1961, the UNGA failed to pass a resolution on the dispute as some member nations favoured the resumption of Dutch-Indonesian talks while others preferred an independent West New Guinea. Consequently, Sukarno was certain that a military campaign was necessary to wrestle control from the Dutch.

Operation Trikora & New York Agreement
On 19 December 1961, Sukarno ordered the Indonesian military to commence a full-scale invasion of West New Guinea. In response, the Dutch ramped up its military presence. Fortunately, the military operation ended when the both parties agreed to sign the New York Agreement on 15 August 1962. Under General Assembly Resolution 1752 (XVII), the United Nations would administer West New Guinea temporarily before the territory is handed over to Indonesia.

The stand-off between the Netherlands and its former colony resulted in a crisis in December of 1961 when Indonesian President Sukarno prepared for and threatened armed conflict. An agreement was negotiated under the supervision of the UN as a result of strong political pressure from the USA. […] The New York Agreement provided for a UN-supervised popular consultation in order to give the Papuans the freedom of choice in determining their future.

An excerpt taken from “Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo” by Niels van Willigen.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that the Indonesian Confrontation broke out due to ideological differences.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Inter-state Tensions. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - What is the United Nations Malaysia Mission - Interstate Tensions Notes

Revisited: What is the United Nations Malaysia Mission?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 1: Inter-state tensions and co-operation: Causes of inter-state tensions

Historical background: The Conflagaration in Malaysia
When the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the concept of a Malaysia Federation in May 1961, there was no outright objection by the neighbouring countries, including Indonesia. However, Indonesian sentiments changed in January 1963, whereby the Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio declared a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) towards Malaysia. Indonesian troops engaged in cross-border raids and anti-Malaysia propaganda was spread to oppose the formation.

The Manila Accord: A truce?
Even so, the parties involved were not completely opposed to make amends through diplomacy. From 7-11 June 1963, the Philippine President Macapagal hosted a meeting in Manila for Indonesian President Sukarno and the Tunku.

During the meeting, the leaders signed the Manila Accord, which expressed their mutual desires to consider the wishes of the people in North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak when deciding on the formation of the Malaysian Federation. In particular, the results of a referendum would be taken into account based on the context of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle 9 of the Annex that advocates the principle of self-determination.

(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes haying been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.

An excerpt taken from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle 9 of the Annex.

The United Nations Malaysia Mission
Following the signing of the Manila Accord, the United Nations Malaysia Mission led by Secretary-General U Thant was formed in August 1963 to ascertain the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarah prior to the creation of the Malaysian Federation. The Tunku agreed a referendum would be held before the Federation was formed, whereas Sukarno would not oppose the Federation if the majority supported it.

However, the Tunku’s decision to sign the London Agreement on 9 July 1963 was deemed problematic by Sukarno. The Agreement stated that the Malaysian Federation would be formed on 31 August 1963. Chronologically, the United Nations Malaysia Mission Report was only published on 14 September 1963, suggesting that the Tunku’s move may have been premature and a violation of the Manila Accord.

But even before anything had been done, before anything had been ascertained, before the U.N. mission’s inquiry had been completed, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putera already insisted that on 16 September Malaysia should be formed.

Why should he make decisions even while the U.N. team’s work was still not completed?

[…] Likewise, I am not pleased by the manner in which the people’s desires were assessed. In Manila, I said that the survey should be conducted in a manner in accordance with article 1541 of the U.N. [Charter], that the survey should be a truly democratic one.

An excerpt taken from Sukarno’s speech at an anti-Malaysia mass rally in Yogyakarta, 25 September 1963.

Notably, the United Nations Malaysia Mission Report concluded that “there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia”. Even so, U Thant expressed dismay at the Tunku’s decision to set an official date for the formation of Malaysia even before the report was concluded.

I later informed the Governments concerned that I would endeavour to report my conclusions to them by 14 September. During the course of the inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak, for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to misunderstanding, confusion, and even resentment among other parties to the Manila agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed after my conclusions had been reached and made known.

An excerpt taken from the United Nations Malaysia Report titled “Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General“, 14 September 1963.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the Konfrontasi occurred mainly as a result of political disagreements?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Inter-state Tensions. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.